

United States Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation with the Russian Federation

- The Obama Administration is committed to missile defense cooperation with the Russian Federation.
- We believe such cooperation is in the national security interests of the United States and Russia, as did the Bush Administration.
- We have a real opportunity at this time to begin missile defense cooperation both bilaterally and within the NATO-Russia Council that will greatly improve regional and international security.
- We believe this cooperation will help strengthen transparency and will reduce Russia's concerns about the United States' missile defense efforts by providing it with further insight into the nature of and motivations for U.S. and NATO ballistic missile defense plans and programs.
- Through transparency and cooperation, we can demonstrate that these plans are not a threat to Russia and its strategic forces.
- Such strong cooperation might also dissuade other states from developing ballistic missiles capable of targeting our countries.
- Finally, such cooperation also could be used to leverage our existing missile defense capabilities, as well as the very strong scientific and technical strength of our industries.
- At the same time, the United States cannot accept any limitations on our missile defense capabilities, which are designed to defend against limited attacks from ballistic missile threats.
- And we have repeatedly communicated this to the Russian Government at the highest levels.
- Restrictions or limitations on U.S. missile defense capabilities are not under discussion, in these talks or in any other forum.

Proposed Legal Agreements

- In order to begin such cooperation, the United States and Russia need to reach agreement on a legal document that defines the scope of the cooperation.
- In 2004, the United States began seeking a Defense Technical Cooperation Agreement (DTCA) with Russia.
- The DTCA is a broad agreement that, once concluded, will address the Parties' responsibilities and rights with respect to a broad range of defense-related cooperative research and development activities.

- In an effort to jumpstart our missile defense cooperation efforts with Russia, the United States decided to seek a Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Agreement (BMDCA).
- The BMDCA was designed to be a framework agreement under which the United States and Russia could begin missile defense cooperation while not limiting either Party's missile defense capabilities in any way.
- Under the proposed agreement the parties sought to establish a framework for bilateral BMD cooperation, including but not limited to: transparency and confidence building measures; BMD exercises; data sharing; research and development; and technology sharing consistent with the laws and regulations of the Parties.
- The purpose and scope of the proposed agreement specifically stated, "This agreement shall not constrain or limit the Parties' respective BMD plans and capabilities numerically, qualitatively, operationally, geographically, or in any other way."
- The proposed agreement would establish a BMD Cooperation Sub-Working Group under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission's Arms Control and International Security Working Group.
- The proposed agreement would have had a duration of 10 years.
- The CIRC-175 for this proposed agreement was approved by Under Secretary Tauscher on May 5, 2010.
- The Russian Government indicated at the time it was discussed last spring that they were not interested in a ballistic missile defense cooperation agreement.

Proposed Bilateral Cooperation

- In order to implement this cooperation, we have established a number of channels, many of which on the U.S. side were created under the auspices of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission.
- Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov co-chair the International Security and Arms Control Working Group.
- This group has met four times since October 2009.
- These Tauscher-Ryabkov discussions were kept strictly segregated from the negotiation of the New START Treaty in Geneva.
- The Defense Relations Working Group is co-chaired by Secretary of Defense Gates and Minister of Defense Serdyukov, which met on September 15th of this year.

- In addition to that higher-level meeting, a follow-up working-level meeting was held in Moscow just last month.
- We have also established a Military Cooperation Working Group, co-chaired by Admiral Mullen and General Makarov, which met in April of this year.
- Several follow-up meetings have been held where missile defense cooperation was included on the agenda, including a meeting last month.
- We are looking to finalize our bilateral U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment, which we expect to complete around the end of the year or early next year.
- We hope to restart the U.S.-Russia missile defense cooperation exercises which occurred from 1998-2006.
- We hope to get agreement soon on a two-year plan with Russia on these exercises.
- We will also continue our efforts to develop a system to allow our two governments to exchange information about global ballistic missile launches.
- The previous agreement, the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) agreement expired on June 4, 2010.

Proposed NATO-Russia Council (NRC) Cooperation

- Prior to the Lisbon NRC Summit, the NRC concluded a Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges, including a review of the potential threat from ballistic missile proliferation.
- The NRC also agreed to recommence the very successful NRC theater missile defense exercises which were carried out from 2002-2008.
- This cooperation would be an excellent way to begin re-engaging our militaries to ensure that they can operate jointly.
- In the medium-term, we are proposing that the missile defense exercise program of work could begin with command post exercises as was previously done and then eventually be expanded.
- We also plan to begin discussion of how we can work together to use NATO and Russian missile defense capabilities to protect against evolving missile threats.

European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Update

- NATO agreed at the Lisbon Summit to develop a missile defense capability to pursue its core task of collective defense.

- The aim of a NATO missile defense capability is to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.
- NATO also agreed to expand its Active-Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program to provide command and control for this territorial missile defense capability which will allow all Allies to contribute systems to this NATO capability should they decide to.
- Finally, NATO allies welcomed the U.S. EPAA as an important voluntary contribution to the NATO capability.
- As we implement the EPAA, there are three critical areas where the State Department is playing a lead role in negotiating the necessary basing and status of forces agreements to host elements of the European Phased Adaptive Approach.
- These are the hosting of the Phase 1 (2011 timeframe) forward deployed radar, the Phase 2 (2015 timeframe) Land-Based SM-3 interceptor site, and the Phase 3 (2018 timeframe) Land-Based SM-3 interceptor site.
- On the deployment of the Phase 1 radar, we have begun discussions with our NATO Allies and are prepared to begin negotiations once agreement on a location has been reached.
- For the Phase 2 Land-Based SM-3 interceptor site, Romania has agreed to host it, and we have begun negotiations on a ballistic missile defense agreement (BMDA).
- For the Phase 3 Land-based SM-3 interceptor site, Poland has agreed to host it, and in July 2010 we signed a protocol which amended the existing BMDA with Poland. The next step to bring this agreement into force is Polish ratification.